In this reply, we provide an analysis of Alter et al. (2013) response to our earlier paper (Thompson et al., 2013). In that paper, we reported difficulty in replicating Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre's (2007) main finding, namely that a sense of disfluency produced by making stimuli difficult to perceive, increased accuracy on a variety of reasoning tasks. Alter, Oppenheimer, and Epley (2013) argue that we misunderstood the meaning of accuracy on these tasks, a claim that we reject. We argue and provide evidence that the tasks were not too difficult for our populations (such that no amount of ''metacognitive unease'' would promote correct responding) and point out that in many cases performance on our tasks was well above chance or on a par with Alter et al. 's (2007) participants. Finally, we reiterate our claim that the distinction between answer fluency (the ease with which an answer comes to mind) and perceptual fluency (the ease with which a problem can be read) is genuine, and argue that Thompson et al. (2013) provided evidence that these are distinct factors that have different downstream effects on cognitive processes.
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Introduction
Alter et al. (2007) hypothesized that the use of intuitive (Type 1) or analytic (Type 2) reasoning processes could be influenced by a feeling of perceptual disfluency. For example, rendering material difficult to read or asking participants to furrow their brows could create metacognitive unease that would reduce Type 1 and increase Type 2 processing, thereby explaining their finding that accuracy on various reasoning tasks improved under conditions experienced as perceptually disfluent. These intriguing results motivated our follow-up studies, pursued in three independent labs, but with the same goal: to replicate the results and extend them in theoretically relevant ways. We found, however, that we were unable to do this in a straightforward manner. Instead, evidence that perceptual disfluency increased correct responding was elusive, with perceptual disfluency enhancing reasoning accuracy only for those of high cognitive ability (Thompson et al., 2013) . In their comment, Alter et al. (2013) argue that we have misunderstood basic methodological and theoretical concepts, and this explains our discrepant findings. Below we address their main points. 
